1 the characteristics of this agreement will be highlighted. Furthermore, the causa concept lies at the root of the distinction. Therefore, the concept as such and the question whether or not a iusta causa is a requirement for the transfer of real rights in an abstract system is necessarily raised.
For the purposes of this discussion reference will be made throughout to the South African and German legal systems as examples of an abstract system, which will be compared with the French legal system as being an example of a causal system, and the Dutch system, which can be described as a mixed system. The construction of the real agreement is anchored in an abstract system. 2 Although the system which is applied in the Netherlands is described as a mixed system, this does not prevent the causal aspects found in the system from being proffered as characteristics of a causal system.
11
The facts are given here in a rather simplified manner. A detail discussion does not fall within the scope of this article, but the following sources may be consulted in this regard: Dondorp en Schrage Levering 21-22; Ehrhardt Justa Causa 137; Fuchs Iusta Causa 135; HazewinkelZuringa Mancipatio 135-140, 164-165; Honsell, Mayer-Maly and Selb Römisches Recht 159; Lokin Leerstukken 167-168; Lokin "Overdracht" 168; Molkenteller Dinglichen Vertrag 63-64, 67-69; Van Oven Romeinsch Privaatrecht 76-79, 227-228; Pflüger "Zwei Digestenstellen" 44; Pugsley 1975 THRHR 323; Van Oven Causa en Levering 30-31 ; Wolf Error 102, 104 ff. 12 There was no obligation on the transferor to donate the money. The agreement was void because the parties were not unanimous regarding the nature of the agreement. 13 The reason (causa) why the transferor delivers the thing is because he is obliged to do so, owing to a preceding obligation to deliver -the legal foundation or basis (causa) for the transfer of real rights is the obligation. 14 Although the Romans did not judge the transfer process in terms of causal and abstract, elements of the respective systems were indeed present in Roman law. However, in itself delivery will not suffice to bring about the transfer of real rights.
The transferor has to deliver the thing with the intention of transferring real rights and the transferee has to take control of the thing with the intention of obtaining real rights. Although the intention forms part of the act of delivery, it is nevertheless a separate requirement for the transfer of real rights. In an abstract system the mutual intention of transferring and receiving real rights is considered a real agreement.
17
This agreement is of crucial importance to an abstract system because, along with delivery, it determines whether or not real rights are transferred to the transferee, and not the obligatory agreement. 18 The concept abstract system is derived precisely from the fact that the real agreement is an independent agreement which is separated from the preceding obligatory agreement. As an abstract juridical act, the real agreement displays two characteristics in particular:
The content of the agreement
Unlike the situation in a causal system, where the mutual intention to transfer and to receive real rights is implied in the obligatory agreement, such an intention is abstracted 19 from the preceding obligation in an abstract system and attached to the act of delivery. 20 What is more, the intention of the parties is construed as an independent real agreement. As the agreement's content consists merely of the mutual intention to transfer and to receive real rights, which intention is abstracted from the causa, reference is made to this characteristic of the real agreement as the delivery (traditio), it should be kept in mind that the term consensualism is insufficient to distinguish between causal and abstract systems. Also in an abstract system there should be consensus between the parties (real agreement) in order for transfer to take place. 17 In an abstract system there is differentiation not only between obligatory agreement and delivery as two independent juristic acts, but also between obligatory agreement and real agreement, a differentiation unknown to a causal system. 18 The real agreement is characteristic of an abstract system, which distinguishes it from a causal system. In a causal system the real agreement does not make any sense. See Drobnig "Transfer of Property" 1014; Cronjé 1984 THRHR 203-204; Krause 1939 AcP 312, 319. 19 The concept abstract is used in imitation of the German terminology, where the word Abstraktion is used in the sense of separation, distinction or isolation. 20 In an abstract system the parties' primary intention, at the moment the obligatory agreement is entered into, is only to bring about an obligation, and not to transfer real rights. The intention to transfer real rights in future (which by implication can be read into the obligatory agreement) is also not sufficient to bring about transfer. See Carey Miller Acquisition 125.
contential abstraction. However, the agreement in itself does not suffice to bring about the transfer of real rights; the thing also needs to be delivered.
An independent agreement with its own requirements
Apart from its contents, the real agreement also needs to be "externally" abstracted or distinguished from the obligatory agreement. This entails that the real agreement is an independent agreement which needs to comply with its own requirements. The question as to whether the agreement is valid or not therefore also needs to be answered independent of the validity of the obligatory agreement or other juridical fact which obliges the transferor to deliver. Should delivery take place on account of a void obligatory agreement or other juridical fact, the specific real right will be transferred to the transferee notwithstanding its being null and void, on condition that a valid real agreement exists. The effect of this is that a valid obligatory agreement is not a requirement for the transfer of real rights in an abstract system. Rather, the fact is acknowledged that the parties can have the intention of transferring real rights, even if the obligatory agreement is null and void and even if they are aware of it.
21
Whether the parties in the case of a void obligatory agreement nevertheless had the intention of transferring real rights (whether or not there is a real agreement), is a factual question which needs to be answered in the light of the circumstances of each case.
22
From the discussion above it is clear that the characteristic of the external abstraction is directly related to the question as to whether or not a valid obligatory The fact that the obligatory agreement or other juridical fact is null and void does not mean to say that the real agreement is also null and void. However, it is indeed possible that the same defect which brings about nullity of the obligatory agreement can also lead to the nullity of the real agreement. Whether the obligatory agreement or the real agreement, or both, are affected by the defect is, however, a factual question the answer to which depends on circumstances. However, it would be incorrect to say that the nullity of the obligatory agreement also leads to the nullity of the real agreement. property. It should be clear that Julian's stance in this respect could be the foundation on which an abstract system (in present-day terms) could be built. Should the transferor deliver a thing owing to a void agreement, real rights will be transferred to the transferee, notwithstanding the fact that he was not obliged to deliver. 23 In those cases where delivery takes place due to a null and void agreement, the reason or causa for delivery is not to be found in the fact that he is obliged to deliver, but because he intends to deliver or he mistakenly thinks that he is obliged to deliver.
Usually such a faulty assumption (or supposed legal ground which is non-existent) is referred to as a putative causa. 24 Whilst the concept iusta causa (the reason for delivery) in a causal system refers to a valid obligation or other juridical fact which obliges the transferor to deliver, in an abstract system it includes an agreement that is null and void or another legal ground which is non-existent, but which the parties mistakenly thought existed.
Practical implications of the differentiation between the two systems
Theoretical doctrines, however, are never ends in themselves, but important only in so far as they analyse the working of the law in practice and ensure the cohesion and consistency of the different rules of a legal system. Therefore, the crux of the 23 The transferor will for instance not be obliged to deliver if the deed of sale is null and void, or if the will on account of which the delivery has taken place has been revoked. 24 The parties for instance are under the impression that they have closed an agreement, but later it emerges that no agreement has been established because it is null and void and that nothing was owed. There will be a putative causa in the following cases too: if the executer transfers erroneously on the basis of the rules of the law of intestate succession, whilst a valid will exists; if he transfers by virtue of a will that has been revoked whilst he was not aware of it; if he transfers on the basis of customary law (the law of succession relating to Black persons), which he incorrectly thinks is applicable to the case involved, whilst it is not.
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matter is: what difference does it make whether one follows the causa or the abstract theory?
25
When judging the pros and cons of each of the systems, the legal position of the respective parties, namely the transferor, the transferee and third parties, as it appears in each system, necessarily needs to be taken into consideration. This also entails that the interests of the respective parties must be balanced.
In a causal system the transferor undoubtedly finds himself in a favourable position vis-à-vis the transferee, since he retains his real right if the thing is delivered on account of a void causa. 26 He can therefore reclaim the thing with the rei vindicatio from the transferee or any third party to whom the thing has been transferred (even if the third party is bona fide), because the transferor is still the holder of the right.
Since the transferee has no right to dispose of the thing, he can also not transfer the thing to someone else. Should the transferee be declared insolvent whilst the thing is still under his control, it does not fall in his insolvent estate.
27
Should the contract not be void, but voidable 28 and it becomes void after the thing has already been delivered, or after registration has taken place, voidance has real effect with retroactive operation up until the date of conclusion of the contract. This means that delivery had taken place by reason of a void causa, that transfer is null and void with retroactive effect and that the thing by operation of law (ex lege) returns to the transferor. The transferor is regarded to have always been the holder of the right and he is therefore not prejudiced by the insolvency of the transferee.
Voidance further also has an absolute effect. This means that the transferor is also considered to be the holder of the right as far as third parties are concerned and that he can claim the thing with the rei vindicatio from any person who has control over it.
29
Protagonists of the causal system justify the system with the following arguments: it protects real rights as a legal institution; the owner should lose his real rights only if an agreed foundation exists for such a loss (hence transfer must rest on a valid obligatory agreement); the legal norms and provisions of a statute that prohibits agreements based on policy considerations must be adhered to. Should an agreement be null and void because it is prohibited by law, such a null and void agreement should also have no legal consequences. No fault can be found with this argument, especially not if the parties are aware of the defect, or if only the transferee was aware of it. Had the transferor been responsible for the defect, or if he had delivered the thing while being aware of the defect, it is, however, debatable in consideration of fairness whether or not he deserves protection.
In an abstract system the transferor is in an unfavourable position vis-à-vis the transferee and third parties since a real right is transferred to the transferee notwithstanding the nullity of the obligatory agreement. In his turn, the transferee may transfer the same real right to a third party, who will become the holder of the right. 30 Furthermore, should the transferee after delivery be declared insolvent, the fact that a real right has been transferred means that the thing falls in his insolvent estate and that the transferor is only a concurrent creditor. Should the first transferor establish, after transfer, that the contract of sale (for instance) is void, he can therefore not reclaim the thing with the rei vindicatio from the transferee or third party to whom he has transferred it in the meantime, because he is no longer the holder of the right. However, this does not mean to say that his hands are tied and that the transferor is worse off when his position is compared with that of the transferee. Because the thing has been transferred sine causa, he has the condictio indebiti at his disposal, by means of which he can reclaim the thing or the value thereof from the transferee. 31 In other words, the only difference between the two systems, when the position of the transferor is compared with that of the transferee, is that the remedies available to the transferor differ. 32 However, the transferor has no claim based on the condictio indebiti against bona fide third parties that have received the thing from the transferee, unless the thing has been transferred to the third party without value.
33
Whilst the causal system gives preference to the interests of the transferor vis-à-vis the transferee, it gives insufficient protection to third parties against the disadvantageous consequences of delivery owing to a void or voidable obligation.
The system can be criticised because it can be unfair towards third parties that presume that the person who has physical control over the thing, or in whose name land has been registered, is also the owner (especially if the third party was not aware or could not have been aware of the fact that someone else is the owner of the thing -if he is bona fide). the requirements mentioned in the act are complied with. 34 The respective provisions are exceptions to the requirement that the transferor must be entitled to dispose of the thing. It has also resulted in the nemo plus iuris rule being eased considerably for the sake of the protection of bona fide third parties.
35
As against the causal system, in an abstract system third parties find themselves in a favourable position -real rights are transferred to the transferee, even if the thing is delivered by virtue of a void obligatory agreement. Should the transferee be sequestrated after delivery, the thing falls into his insolvent estate. The transferor then has only a concurrent claim, which is scant consolation. 36 The criticism against the system is that the insolvent's creditors share in the yields of a thing which, in terms of a void juristic act, came into his hands. No reason exists why they have to be favoured in such circumstances to the detriment of the transferor, especially not if the transferee was aware of the defect or was responsible for it. Should the transferor have been aware of the defect in the legal basis for delivery and not the transferee, it can again be argued that it is just fair for real rights to pass, especially if it transpires that, notwithstanding his knowledge of the defect, he still intended to transfer the real right concerned.
Finally it is pointed out that third parties also enjoy protection by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel. In appropriate circumstances the transferor can in terms of this doctrine be prohibited from claiming his thing from the third party with the rei vindicatio.
Should the transferor neglect to claim the thing immediately from the transferee to whom he transferred, he makes a misrepresentation to the third party that the transferee has obtained a legal title which is transferrable. Protagonists of the abstract system are nevertheless prepared to accept that creditors of the transferee and third parties are unduly favoured by the system, since it grants bona fide third parties considerable protection, even when it is to the detriment of the transferor. 38 The third party to whom the transferee has transferred the thing in the meantime becomes the owner, notwithstanding the fact that his predecessor had obtained the thing by reason of a void agreement. The transferor will therefore not be able to claim from the third party with the rei vindicatio. This favourable position of third parties is, amongst others, justified with an appeal to the publicity principle, legal certainty and considerations of equity. Third parties that rely, as they are entitled to, on the apparent legal certainty of the transferor's title and regard him as the holder of the right, 39 should not be disappointed regarding their trust. In this respect the abstract system promotes legal certainty, since it prevents that doubt regarding the validity of the obligatory agreement or other juridical fact which obliges the transferor to deliver from also impacting on the validity of the act of delivery. Outsiders can accept that the person who is apparently the holder of the right is indeed entitled to dispose of a thing. 40 Should a third party not have known, or was not supposed to know, that the transfer to his predecessor had taken place in terms of a void agreement, it would be unfair to sacrifice his rights in favour of the transferor. The reasoning is that a defective agreement as the legal basis for delivery falls rather within the terrain of responsibility of the transferor than within that of the third party, especially if he was aware of the defect. The necessity of choosing between the causal and the abstract systems arises only in those exceptional cases where the obligation or other legal ground is null and void, where there is legally no foundation by virtue of which delivery takes place and both parties nevertheless have the intention to transfer real rights. Should A for instance think he is selling the thing involved to B, but B is of the opinion that he is receiving a gift, no valid obligatory agreement comes into being due to the lack of consensus. However, both parties intended to transfer property to B through delivery. 44 In such a situation there is one of two choices: (1) property is indeed transferred (abstract) or (2) property is not transferred (causal).
Is a causa a requirement at all in an abstract system?
In Roman law and even long after, the point of view occurred that although a valid obligation or other legal ground (iusta causa) might not have been a requirement for the transfer of real rights, a reason (causa) for transfer had to exist. This view still 42 As already indicated, real rights can be transferred in an abstract system, even though the obligatory legal ground is null and void, for example because the prescribed requirements regarding form have not been met. 43 Consult Asser and Beekhuis Zakenrecht 179-180; Pitlo Zakenrecht 204, 209-210. The lastmentioned nevertheless grants that this viewpoint is also subjective and that there is still room for an opposite viewpoint. He points out that a marriage concluded with a view simply to obtaining another nationality is nevertheless valid. 44 However, each party has another reason (or legal ground) which forms the basis for his intention to transfer the property. Consult Carey Miller Acquisition 124.
occurs today. It is justified with the argument that no one transfers something without a reason and that the transfer of property must always rest on one ground or another, which legally serves as justification for the transfer of real rights -real rights cannot be transferred unless a legal basis exists which is suitable for bringing about the transfer.
However, this viewpoint cannot be supported. Should the causa, in the sense of an obligatory agreement or other legal ground which obliges a party to deliver, not have to be valid, it is senseless to insist at all on a causa (obligation) as a requirement for transfer of real rights. If the viewpoint is followed through to its logical consequences, it amounts to a void obligation or other legal basis which is non-existent, but which the parties mistakenly think exists (a putative causa), being a requirement for the transfer of real rights. 45 It is proposed that if the causa, in the sense of some or other obligation or other legal ground does not have to be valid, it is unnecessary to insist at all on a causa as a requirement for the transfer of real rights in an abstract system. Only a valid juridical act can really be legally obligatory. It is suggested that a causa as a requirement for the transfer of real rights should be given up in an abstract system. Alternatively another meaning should be attached to the concept.
46
In Roman law an obligatory agreement was a requirement for the transfer of real rights. 47 Therefore, the definition of the causa concept with reference to such an agreement was indeed meaningful. However, in an abstract system it serves no purpose to describe the causa with reference to the obligatory agreement, since it is no substantive law requirement for the transfer of real rights. 48 202-213. 48 In the vast majority of cases delivery will indeed take place owing to a legal obligation which will also be the reason or legal ground (causa) for delivery. But if the agreement is null and void and property is nevertheless transferred, it is of no use to define the causa with reference to a valid causa. A definition is meant to provide for all possibilities, as far as possible.
required is that both parties should have the intention to transfer and to receive real rights. The causa therefore refers to the mutual intention to transfer and receive real rights, which is nothing less than the real agreement. 49 The reason why the transferor delivers the thing not important is in any case when the requirements for the transfer of real rights are under discussion. What is indeed important, and this is what the law is interested in, is the reason for the transfer. Should delivery take place by virtue of an obligatory agreement that is null and void, the reason or causa for the transferor to deliver the thing is in any case not because he is obliged to do so through an obligation but because he intends to transfer a real right (or because he mistakenly thinks he is obliged to do so).
50
Should this viewpoint be correct (and it is suggested that it is indeed so), the causa concept would be superfluous in an abstract system, because it hwould have been incorporated into the real agreement. It would be unnecessary to insist on a causa (which is the intention to transfer real rights) as a requirement for the transfer of real rights and, besides, to also require a real agreement (i.e. the intention to transfer and to receive real rights).
In Roman law the causa for delivery (preceding obligation) and the causa for the transfer of property (the intention to transfer real rights) were not distinguished from each other. 51 Not one single text exists in the Corpus Iuris Civilis that expressly states the intention to transfer as a requirement for the transfer of real rights (it simply played a subordinate role), and also no text exists that defines the causa with reference to the transferor's intention. Julianus' point of view, which is described above, does present links for the fact that the reason or causa for delivery can be found in the intention to transfer real rights, but no consensus exists regarding the 49 But see Scholtens 1957 SALJ 280 who defines "the circumstances underlying the intention to transfer ownership by traditio" as the causa. 50 The reason (causa) for delivery and the reason (causa) for the transfer of property (which do not necessarily correspond in an abstract system) need to be differentiated from each other. In a causal system, the reason for delivery will necessarily also be the reason for transfer, because delivery is not an independent act. Savigny did not proffer reasons for the change in his viewpoint, but there is a strong probability that he did it because in a legal-historical sense it is incorrect to define the causa as the intention. The concept has always referred to a preceding obligation.
His definition, therefore, did not correspond with the sources, and he was aware of the fact that his theory had to correspond with classical Roman law. Although he attempted to keep as close as possible to the historic meaning of the concept with his new definition (causa is the circumstances from which the intention can be determined, for instance the preceding obligation), the irony is that it is also incorrect in a legal historical and linguistic sense. The fact that a preceding obligatory agreement or other juridical fact which obliges delivery in an abstract system is not a requirement for the transfer of real rights does not mean to say that it is entirely irrelevant. The importance of the obligatory agreement in an abstract system lies in the fact that it can serve as proof that the parties, at the moment when the thing was transferred, had the intention of transferring real rights. Although an obligatory agreement is not a substantive law requirement for the transfer of real rights (it is not a factum probandum), it is a means of proof from which the parties' intention to transfer real rights can be determined (it is a factum probans). 55 From the agreement it can be deduced whether the intention was directed at the transfer of real rights (as with purchase and exchange), or not (as with hire and pledge). 56 The form in which the agreement is agreement does not yet transfer real rights; it only creates rights and obligations. The act of delivery (which is a separate requirement for the transfer of real rights) in turn aims at complying with the obligation which arises from the agreement and from ending the obligation. The Dutch system therefore differs from a causal system as it is applied in France in this respect, that real rights are not transferred by the conclusion of the obligatory agreement; a separate act of delivery also has to take place.
63
In an abstract system, acknowledgement of delivery (traditio) as a separate juridical act in the process of transfer leads to the mental disposition with which the act of delivery is executed (the mutual intention of transferring and receiving real rights) to be construed as a separate real agreement. Although the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek does not require a real agreement for the transfer of real rights in the Netherlands, there is no doubt that a real agreement is indeed a requirement and that it fulfils an important function. 64 However, there are also academics and practitioners in the Netherlands that subject the real agreement to criticism, as it is redundant in their opinion. 65 As the real agreement is one of the outstanding characteristics of an abstract system, the Dutch system is abstract in this respect (contential abstraction). 66 It differs from a pure causal system (such as that in France), where the intention of transferring and receiving real rights does not exist independently of the obligatory agreement, but forms an inherent part of that agreement.
The statement is often come across that a causal system is applied in the Netherlands. It should, however, now be clear that such a statement is incorrect.
This statement is founded on the fact that a valid obligatory agreement is a requirement for the transfer of real rights in the Netherlands, which is a characteristic 18-19; Van Oven 1935 WPNR 70. Furthermore Cronjé 1984 As has already been remarked, the construction of the real agreement goes hand in hand with an abstract system (it is the creation of an abstract system).
of a causal system. It is, however, not realised that the Netherlands also displays the following characteristics of an abstract system, namely (1) real rights are not transferred by means of the obligatory agreement; an act of delivery must also take place; and (2) a real agreement (which forms part of the act of delivery) is a requirement for the transfer of real rights.
Characteristics of a causal system
The Dutch legal system does indeed also display the characteristics of a causal system, as applied in France, since a valid obligatory agreement is a requirement for the transfer of real rights. If an obligatory agreement is null and void, this prevents the transfer of real rights. In this respect it differs therefore from the South African and the German systems. Although a real agreement is a separate requirement for the transfer of real rights in the Netherlands, the practical value of the real agreement is limited by the requirement that the obligatory agreement has to be valid. 67 Should the obligatory agreement be null and void, real rights will not be transferred even if the parties had the intention of transferring and even if there is a valid real agreement. The question as to whether or not a valid real agreement exists is therefore relevant only if the obligatory agreement is valid. The circumstances could for instance have changed since the conclusion of the contract to such an extent that one or both parties at the time of delivery (for instance due to defects with consensus) no longer have the intention to transfer the specific real right. Other factors may also prevent the transfer of real rights, for instance the fact that the transferor is no longer entitled to dispose of the thing. Real rights will in these circumstances not be transferred, not because the obligatory agreement is null and void, but because no valid real agreement exists. The real agreement is necessitated precisely by the fact that delivery in the Netherlands (unlike in France) is a separate requirement for the transfer of real rights, and that it entails more than simply a factual act.
Should the obligatory agreement be valid, there are no essential differences between the abstract system as it is applied in South Africa and the system as it is applied in In a causal system the concept iusta causa refers to a valid and enforceable obligatory agreement or other juridical fact which obliges the transferee to deliver the thing. In an abstract system it serves no purpose to describe the causa with reference to the obligatory agreement, since it is not a substantive law requirement for the transfer of real rights. The causa concept refers rather to the mutual intention to transfer and to receive real rights, which is nothing less than the real agreement. Since the causa is contained in the real 
